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1990]
BANKRUPTCY LAW-PENNSYLVANIA HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY MAY
DISCONTINUE EMERGENCY MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS TO
RECIPIENTS WHO FILE FOR BANKRUPTCY
Watts v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Co. (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Home-
owner's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (HEMAP) in order to
provide "emergency mortgage assistance payments, prevent widespread
mortgage foreclosures and distress sales of homes which result from de-
fault caused by circumstances beyond a homeowner's control."'
HEMAP authorizes the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency (PHFA)
to pay directly to an eligible homeowner's mortgagee both the full
amount of any accrued arrearages as well as monthly payments to keep
the mortgage current.2 This mortgage assistance is intended to be tem-
porary,3 and is made in the form of a loan to the eligible homeowner,
secured by a mortgage lien on the home and repayable with interest.4
A homeowner must satisfy a number of eligibility requirements in
order to obtain assistance under HEMAP. 5 One significant requirement
is that the "mortgagee has indicated to the mortgagor its intention to
foreclose" 6 and that -It]he mortgagee is not prevented by law from
foreclosing upon the mortgage." 7
This creates an interesting interplay with bankruptcy law. Under
section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay prevents a
mortgagee from foreclosing against a mortgagor who has filed for bank-
ruptcy.8 Therefore, a homeowner who has filed for bankruptcy will not
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1680.401c note (Purdon Supp. 1990) (Findings
and Purpose). HEMAP, in its entirety, is codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 1680.401c-.41 Ic (Purdon Supp. 1990). HEMAP will expire on December 23,
1992. Id. § 1680.411c.
2. Id. § 1680.405c(a)-(b).
3. The statute provides that HEMAP assistance "shall be provided for a
period not to exceed thirty-six (36) months, either consecutively or nonconsecu-
tively." Id. § 1680.405c(f). It also provides that PHFA may terminate payments
at any point where PHFA "determines that, because of the changes in the mort-
gagor's financial circumstances, the payments are no longer necessary ...." Id.
4. Id. §§ 1680.405c(g), .406c.
5. See id. § 1680.404c(a).
6. Id. § 1680.404c(a)(2)(i).
7. Id. § 1680.404c(a)(7).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988). Section 362(a)(3) provides that the filing
of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of "any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate." Id. A mortgage foreclosure action falls within this sec-
tion, and thus is an act that is stayed. See In re Penfil, 40 Bankr. 474 (Bankr. E.D.
(689)
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be eligible for HEMAP assistance because the mortgagee is prevented
by law from foreclosing.9
A difficult situation arises where a homeowner who is already re-
ceiving HEMAP assistance files for bankruptcy. Under this scenario, the
homeowner was able to satisfy HEMAP's eligibility requirements at the
time of the application for assistance, but subsequently fails the require-
ments during the period in which she is receiving assistance. In such a
case, may the PHFA lawfully discontinue the assistance payments once
the homeowner files for bankruptcy, because the homeowner no longer
satisfies the requirements for HEMAP assistance? The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit answered this question in the
affirmative in Watts v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Co. 10
In Watts, three named plaintiffs, I I Dorothy Watts, Robert Bratton
and Mr. and Mrs. John Pizzileo, applied for and were determined eligi-
ble to receive HEMAP assistance. 12 PHFA cured Watts's and Bratton's
arrearages and temporarily provided them with monthly payments to
help keep their mortgages current.' 3 Once Watts and Bratton filed for
bankruptcy, however, PHFA suspended their monthly payments. 14
Although PHFA approved the Pizzileos' application, it never provided
any mortgage assistance because the Pizzileos filed for bankruptcy
shortly after their application was approved.' 5 PHFA notified Watts and
Bratton of the termination of their assistance in a form letter which read
in part, "the Agency is discontinuing your monthly assistance under
[HEMAP] due to your filing for bankruptcy." ' 6
Mich. 1984) (recording of sheriff's deed after foreclosure sale is violation of au-
tomatic stay); In re Scott, 24 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1982) (foreclosure sale
is null and void when held in violation of automatic stay); see also 16 PA. CODE
§ 40.202(e) (1987) (if homeowner in bankruptcy at time of application for PHFA
mortgage assistance, such assistance is contingent upon, inter alia, lifting of stay).
9. See 16 PA. CODE § 40.202(e) (1987). Of course, if the automatic stay did
not apply or was lifted, then the HEMAP requirement that the mortgagee not be
prevented by law from foreclosing would be satisfied.
10. 876 F.2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1989).
11. The action was brought as a class action suit, in which the plaintiff class
consisted of all individuals who have applied for or will in the future apply for,
or have been awarded HEMAP benefits and thereafter become debtors under
the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1092. Plaintiffs' motion to maintain the action as a
class action was granted by the bankruptcy court. In re Watts, 76 Bankr. 390,
400-01 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
12. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1091.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Pizzileos were informed by the PHFA that their application had
been "reevaluated," and that no assistance would be provided. Id.
16. Id. at 1091-92 (emphasis added). The form letter further provided:
Pursuant to [HEMAP], a homeowner is ineligible for assistance
when the mortgagee is prevented by law from foreclosing upon the
mortgage. As long as the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Court re-
mains in effect, the mortgagee is prohibited from instituting foreclo-
690 [Vol. 35: p. 689
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The plaintiffs filed suit against PHFA, alleging that PHFA's suspen-
sion of monthly payments following the filing of their bankruptcy peti-
tions violated the anti-discrimination provision of the Bankruptcy
Code, 17 the automatic stay provision of the Code, 18 as well as 42 U.S.C.
section 1983.19 The bankruptcy court held that each of these three pro-
visions had been violated and granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs.20 On appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. 2 1 The
Third Circuit reversed, holding that PHFA's practice of suspending
assistance upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition violated neither the
anti-discrimination provision nor the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code.2 2 Because the court found no violation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, it held that 42 U.S.C. section 1983 could not have been
violated. 23
Additionally, the court held that the Code's anti-discrimination pro-
vision, contained in section 525, did not apply to a HEMAP loan.2 4 Sec-
tion 525 provides, in pertinent part, that "a governmental unit may not
deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter,
franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to, [or] discrimi-
nate with respect to such a grant against ... [a bankruptcy debtor] ...
solely because" of the bankruptcy filing. 25 PHFA did not dispute that it
sure proceedings against you. Accordingly, you presently fail to satisfy
this eligibility requirement.
Id. at 1092 (citation omitted).
17. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988). For a discussion of this provision, see
infra notes 24-32, 42-67, 97-102 and accompanying text.
18. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1092; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988). For a discus-
sion of this provision, see infra notes 33-41, 68-89, 103-05 and accompanying
text.
19. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1092; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). For a discussion
of the court's treatment of the section 1983 claim, see infra note 23.
20. In re Watts, 76 Bankr. 390, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
21. In re Watts, 93 Bankr. 350 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
22. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1097.
23. Id. The court stated that "[b]ecause the plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim is dependent upon a finding of a [Bankruptcy] Code violation, it also must
fail." Id. All of the courts involved in this case recognized that a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 depends entirely upon the success or failure of the claims under
the Bankruptcy Code. See id.; Watts, 76 Bankr. at 408-09; Watts, 93 Bankr. at 357.
That is, in order to set forth a valid section 1983 claim, one need only to estab-
lish that rights under the Constitution or any federal law have been violated. See
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (section 1983 encompasses claims based
on violations of federal statutory law). Since the Bankruptcy Code is a federal
statute, any violation of the Code gives rise to a valid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
Higgins v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 54 Bankr. 928, 933-34 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Because the plaintiffs' section 1983 claim is collateral to the central issues
considered in the case, as well as in this piece, it is not discussed further.
24. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1093-94.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
3
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was a "governmental unit." 26 Rather, PHFA urged, and the Third Cir-
cuit adopted, the reasoning that, in enacting section 525, Congress did
not intend "to prohibit the sort of temporary suspension of mortgage
financing involved in this case."'2 7
The basis of the court's decision on this issue was that "a HEMAP
loan simply is not a 'license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar
grant.' "128 The court reasoned that the statute's catch-all term, "other
similar grant," referred only to items similar to those listed immediately
before it.2 9 Therefore, "other similar grant" referred to "items ... in
the nature of indicia of authority from a governmental unit to the au-
thorized person to pursue some endeavor." '30 Since a loan does not au-
thorize a person to pursue some endeavor, it is not a grant within the
context of section 525.31 Furthermore, the court held that suspension
of HEMAP assistance did not violate the "fresh start" policy of the
Bankruptcy Code.3 2
In the second part of its opinion, the court ruled that PHFA did not
violate the automatic stay provision in section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code.3 3 Section 362(a)(3) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion operates as a stay of "any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property
of the estate."' 34 Specifically, the court held that the automatic stay of
section 362 did not apply because another Code section, section
365(e)(2)(B), expressly permitted termination of the type of contract in
which PHFA and the plaintiffs had engaged.3 5
26. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1092.
27. Id. at 1093. PHFA argued alternatively that it did not suspend HEMAP
payments "solely because" of the bankruptcy filings. Id. at 1094 n.5. The court
found it unnecessary to address this argument. Id.
28. Id. at 1093 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon In re Gol-
drich, in which the Second Circuit applied a similar literal approach to section
525 in holding that a credit guarantee was not a "similar grant." Id. at 1093
(citing 771 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1985)). For a further discussion of Goldrich, see
infra notes 58-64, 97-100 and accompanying text.
32. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1094. It has long been held that one of the primary
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide the debtor with a "fresh start."
See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). The Watts court per-
ceived no violation of this "fresh start" policy in the present case because mort-
gage assistance could be "reinstated once the stay [was] lifted if foreclosure
[was] still threatened ...." Watts, 876 F.2d at 1094. In fact, the record reflects
that each of the named plaintiffs was determined to be re-eligible for assistance
benefits once the stay was lifted. Id. at 1094 n.4.
33. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988).
35. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095-96. PHFA did not raise the issue of the applica-
bility of section 365 in the initial bankruptcy court proceeding. Consequently,
when PHFA attempted to raise the issue on appeal in the district court, the court
refused to consider the issue, applying the general rule that a federal appellate
4
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Section 365(e)(2)(B) provides that an executory contract to make a
loan or to extend other financial accommodations to or for the benefit of
the debtor is an exception from the general rule prohibiting the termi-
nation of contracts because of a bankruptcy filing.36 A contract is execu-
tory when "performance remains due to some extent on both sides." '3 7
The Watts court held that performance was due on both sides of PHFA's
contract with the plaintiffs when the assistance was terminated 8 and,
therefore, under section 365(e)(2)(B) PHFA was not barred from termi-
nating its performance under its contract with the plaintiffs.3 9 Although
the automatic stay provision of the Code-specifically, section
362(a)(3)-could be interpreted as forbidding PHFA from withholding
the plaintiffs' mortgage payments after the bankruptcy petitions were
filed,40 the Third Circuit did not accept this interpretation. Rather, it
court may not consider an issue not passed on below. In re Watts, 93 Bankr.
350, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
The Third Circuit noted this refusal by the district court, but decided that it was
proper to consider the issue "because the purely legal question of section 365's
applicability is inextricably intertwined with the issue of whether the automatic
stay was violated in this case .... " Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095 n.8.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B) (1988). The general rule prohibiting the ter-
mination of executory contracts because of a bankruptcy filing is stated in sec-
tion 365(e)(1) which provides:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired
lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obliga-
tion under such contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at
any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provi-
sion in such a contract or lease that is conditioned on-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time
before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under
this title or a custodian before such commencement.
Id. § 365(e)(1) (citations omitted). Subsection (2)(B) reads:
Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract
or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of du-
ties, if- . . . (B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend
other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit
of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor.
Id. § 365(e)(2)(B).
37. In re National Sugar Ref. Co., 26 Bankr. 765, 767 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983); accord In re Pennsylvania Tire Co., 26 Bankr. 663, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1982) ("[t]o fall within the ambit of Section 365, a contract must be one, 'on
which performance remains due to some extent on both sides.' ") (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6303-04).
38. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1096 n.9. The court reasoned that because "PHFA
was to have advanced payments to plaintiffs' mortgagees, and plaintiffs were ob-
ligated to repay PHFA," the contract was executory. Id.
39. Id. at 1096.
40. Both the district court and the bankruptcy court below held that section
362(a)(3) was violated by PHFA when it withheld the payments. In re Watts, 93
5
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relied on the specific exception for executory contracts and stated that it
was "unwilling to grant 'a protection or benefit pursuant to [section




The legislative history of section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code indi-
cates that the section was passed for the express purpose of codifying
the result of the Supreme Court's decision in Perez v. Campbell.42 In Pe-
rez, an Arizona state law which required the suspension of a driver's li-
cense until satisfaction of an accident-related judgment, even where the
judgment was discharged in bankruptcy, was declared unconstitu-
tional.4 3 The Supreme Court held that the statute was in conflict with
the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code and was thus invalid
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 44
Although Perez dealt solely with a judgment in tort,45 Congress's
codification of Perez purposely went much further. The legislative his-
tory provides that section 525's list of various forms of discrimination
against former bankrupts is "not exhaustive" and "is not intended to
permit other forms of discrimination." 4 6 This language appears to indi-
cate that discrimination in any form against a debtor by a governmental
unit is impermissible under section 525. 4 7 In the same paragraph, how-
Bankr. 350, 356-57 (E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Watts, 76 Bankr. 390, 408 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987). In order to hold that PHFA violated section 362(a)(3), it was first
necessary to determine, as both the lower courts did, that the prospective
HEMAP payments were "property of the estate." See Watts, 93 Bankr. at 356;
Watts, 76 Bankr. at 407. The Third Circuit found it "unnecessary" to rule on
this "property of the estate" issue because it held that section 362(a)(3) was
inapplicable to this case. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095. In a footnote, however, the
court did cite authority which indicates that the court might have ruled that the
HEMAP payments were not property of the estate. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095 n.7
(citing Creative Data Forms, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Minority Business Dev., 72
Bankr. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1986)). For a further
discussion of the "property of the estate" issue, see infra notes 69-88 and accom-
panying text.
41. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1096 (quoting In re New Town Mall, 17 Bankr. 326,
329 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982)).
42. 402 U.S. 637 (1971); see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5867.
43. Perez, 402 U.S. at 656.
44. Id. at 648-52.
45. The Court stated that "[t]here can be no doubt.., that Congress in-
tended [the "fresh start"] to include freedom from most kinds of pre-existing
tort judgments." Id. at 648.
46. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 42, at 5867.
47. This was the position taken by both lower courts. See In re Watts, 93
Bankr. 350, 354-55 (E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Watts, 76 Bankr. 390, 402-06 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987). One commentator has stated her belief that the case law on
6
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ever, the Senate Report goes on to say that "[t]his section permits fur-
ther development to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-
governmental organizations that perform licensing functions, such as a State
bar association or a medical society, or by other organizations that can seri-
ously affect the debtors' livelihood or fresh start .... -48 The specific
reference to "organizations that perform licensing functions" implies
that section 525 is targeted exclusively at licensing boards and similar
agencies that grant authoritative, enabling documents.4 9 Yet, the catch-
all phrase "or by other organizations," and the reference to the effect on
the debtor's "fresh start," permits the inference that the section is
designed to forbid any governmental discrimination which impedes the
debtor's "fresh start." 50
It is this inherently contradictory language within the legislative his-
tory that has given rise to the issue of the extent of section 525's applica-
bility. Pro-debtor courts, including many of the bankruptcy courts
across the country, have read the language and legislative history of sec-
tion 525 to condemn virtually all forms of discrimination against a
debtor.5 ' Other courts, particularly federal appellate courts, have taken
a more conservative stance, reading section 525 literally.5 2 In Watts, the
Third Circuit adopted the latter approach by ruling that PHFA's suspen-
sion of mortgage assistance did not fall within the scope of section
section 525 "implicitly or explicitly support[s] the view that where a governmen-
tal entity treats a debtor differently from everyone else discrimination [under
section 525] occurs." Annotation, Protection of Debtor from Acts of Discrimination by
Governmental Units Under § 525 of Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 68 A.L.R. FED. 137, 141
(1984).
48. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 42, at 5867 (emphasis added).
49. This was the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Watts. See Watts, 876 F.2d
at 1093-94.
50. The district court adopted this approach, stating that "[t]he legislative
history of § 525 indicates that Congress sought to attack, in a broad manner,
discriminatory practices by governmental entities that would prevent a debtor
from taking advantage of ... a financial 'fresh start.' " Watts, 93 Bankr. at 355.
51. See Watts, 76 Bankr. at 403; see also In re Son-Shine Grading, Inc., 27
Bankr. 693 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) (state department of transportation's dis-
qualification of debtor from bidding on contracts for department because of
debtor's pending bankruptcy petition violated section 525); In re Gibbs, 9 Bankr.
758, 764 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (eviction of debtor by public housing authority
solely because debtor filed for bankruptcy violated section 525), aff'd in part,
Gibbs v. Housing Auth. of New Haven, 76 Bankr. 257, 263 (D. Conn. 1983); In
re Heath, 3 Bankr. 351 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1980) (state university's refusal to issue
transcript to Chapter 13 debtor until debtor paid pre-petition debt owed to uni-
versity violated section 525).
52. See In re Goldrich, 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985) (section 525 does not
prevent government denial of student loan based upon default in repayment of
discharged loan); Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.
1984) (college transcript may be withheld to collect student loan not discharged
by debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy); In re Rees, 61 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. D. Utah
1986) (imposition by state agency of higher tax rate on employer-debtor due to
debtor's failure to pay prior taxes not within scope of section 525).
1990] 695
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525.53
The literal approach is based on a long-standing rule of statutory
construction which provides that where the language of a statute is un-
ambiguous, the court's inquiry stops. 54 The Watts court read the lan-
guage of section 525 as unambiguous. 5 5 Therefore, the court found
that, regardless of Congress's intent that section 525 be further devel-
oped, the language of section 525 could not be extended to encompass
a loan.56
In support of its narrow reading of section 525, 57 the court relied
heavily upon the Second Circuit's decision in In re Goldrich.5 8 In Goldrich,
a former debtor was denied a guaranteed student loan because he had
never repaid a prior guaranteed student loan. 59 The debt owed under
the prior loan had been discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding, but a
New York statute provided that " '[a]ny student who is in default in the
repayment of any guaranteed student loan ... shall not be eligible for
any ... student loan so long as such default status . . .continues.' "60
Accordingly, the New York state agency authorized to guarantee student
loans refused to do so. 6 1
The Goldrich court held that the New York law did not violate sec-
tion 525 because "section 525 does not promise protection against con-
sideration of the prior bankruptcy in post-discharge credit
arrangements. " 6 2 In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit adopted
the literal approach and held that the language of section 525 did not
cover credit guarantees. 63 The Goldrich court stated, "Had Congress in-
tended to extend [section 525] to cover loans or other forms of credit, it
could have included some term that would have supported such an
53. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1093-94.
54. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) ("[w]hen... terms of
a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete"); United States v. Ore-
gon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (no need to resort to legislative history if statute
is clear and unequivocal on its face).
55. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1093.
56. Id. at 1093-94.
57. Actually, the court did not consider its interpretation of section 525 to
be narrow. Rather, the court stated "that when an unambiguous statute is inter-
preted to mean what it says, the interpretation is not narrow." Id. at 1093. De-
spite this assertion, there are a number of bankruptcy courts that apply section
525 broadly, which supports the proposition that the Watts court's reading of
section 525 is indeed narrow. For examples of courts which have interpreted
section 525 broadly, see infra note 101.
58. 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985).
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id. (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 661(6)(b) (McKinney 1988)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id. The court demonstrated its application of the literal approach by
noting its "relucta[nce] to probe behind the plain language of the statute." Id.
696 [Vol. 35: p. 689
8




The Watts court relied on this dicta of Goldrich in ruling that PHFA
had not violated section 525.65 The Watts court compared the HEMAP
mortgage assistance with the credit guarantees in Goldrich and reasoned
that if the credit guarantees fell outside of section 525, then HEMAP
assistance did as well. 66 The court further explained that it was reluc-
tant to extend section 525 in this case because PHFA's suspension of
mortgage assistance did not offend the "fresh start" policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 67
B. Automatic Stay Provision
Both the bankruptcy court and the district court in Watts held that
PHFA violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code by
discontinuing the plaintiffs' HEMAP assistance payments. 6 8 In order to
reach this conclusion it was first necessary to determine that prospective
HEMAP loan payments constituted "property of the estate."' 69 Both
lower courts made such a determination, relying primarily upon cases in
which a debtor's interest in receiving energy assistance grants was held
to be property of the estate. 70
In Morris v. Philadelphia Electric Co. 7 1 and In re Maya,7 2 the courts
held that assistance payments from a governmental agency were prop-
erty of the estate. 7 3 Watts is similar to these two cases to the extent that
64. Id.
65. See Watts, 876 F.2d at 1093-94.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1094. For a further discussion of the "fresh start" policy as ap-
plied to the facts of Watts, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
68. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095; see In re Watts, 93 Bankr. 350, 356-57 (E.D. Pa.
1988); In re Watts, 76 Bankr. 390, 407-08 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). In particular,
the lower courts held that section 362(a)(3) had been violated by PHFA. See
Watts, 93 Bankr. at 356-57; Watts, 76 Bankr. at 407-08; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1988). For a further discussion of section 362(a)(3), see supra notes 8, 33-34
and accompanying text.
69. Section 362(a)(3) stays only those acts to obtain possession or other-
wise control property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988). Section
541 defines "property of the estate" as "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Id. § 541(a)(1). The
United States Supreme Court has held that "property of the estate" should be
interpreted broadly. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-
05 (1983). Whiting Pools was a Chapter 11 case, however, and thus its discussion
regarding property of the estate may not apply in a Chapter 7 case. See A. Co-
HEN & L. FORMAN, BANKRUPTCY, ARTICLE 9, AND CREDITOR'S REMEDIES 563 (2d
ed. 1989) (explaining that Whiting Pools interpretation of section 541 may not
apply to Chapter 7 cases).
70. See Watts, 93 Bankr. at 356; Watts, 76 Bankr. at 407.
71. 45 Bankr. 350 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
72. 8 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
73. Morris, 45 Bankr. at 351; Maya, 8 Bankr. at 207.
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the payments at issue were assistance payments from a state agency.74
There is, however, a crucial factual distinction between Watts and Morris
and Maya. In Watts, the assistance payments at issue were withheld,
while in Morris and Maya, the payments were actually made to the debt-
ors' creditors. 75 Accordingly, in Morris and Maya, the actions were
brought against the utility-creditors, which had applied the post-petition
payments to offset pre-petition debts. 7 6
Where post-petition payments have been made to the debtor's cred-
itor and that creditor has applied the payments to a pre-petition debt,
policy considerations mandate holding against the creditor-defendant.
The Morris court summarized:
Once plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy they were no longer
under a legal obligation to pay [their creditor] the prepetition
debt they had incurred. By applying plaintiffs' [assistance] pay-
ments to plaintiffs' dischargeable utility bills, [their creditor]
defeated the underlying purpose of the [assistance program].
Instead of [the assistance] funds being used to pay postpetition
debts which plaintiffs still have an obligation to satisfy, the
funds were used to offset debts plaintiffs had no legal obliga-
tion to pay. [Their creditor] collected on an otherwise uncol-
lectable debt .... 77
This analysis focused on the actions of the creditor. By using the pay-
ment to settle an "otherwise uncollectible debt," the creditor had com-
pletely circumvented the primary purpose of the automatic stay. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the Morris court ruled that the payments
were property of the plaintiffs' estate because otherwise it would have
been unable to hold that the creditor had violated the Bankruptcy
Code. 78
The Third Circuit in Watts did not directly address the applicability
of Morris and Maya, other than to note briefly that both were distinguish-
able because they involved actions against creditors. 79 Further, the
74. Both lower courts in Watts drew this analogy. See Watts, 93 Bankr. 350,
356 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Watts, 76 Bankr. 390, 407 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). The
district court noted that HEMAP assistance, much like energy assistance, is
designed primarily to "provide economic assistance for vital human needs."
Watts, 93 Bankr. at 356.
75. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095 n.6.
76. Id. Although the Watts court noted this distinction, it did not discuss it.
See id.
77. Morris, 45 Bankr. at 354.
78. The lower court in Morris, however, held that the payments were not
property of the estate. Morris, 45 Bankr. at 351; see In re Morris, 32 Bankr. 635
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983). Because each of the plaintiffs' causes of action were
"predicated on a finding that the grant was property of the estate," the court
denied all requested relief and granted the creditor-defendant's motion to dis-
miss. Morris, 32 Bankr. at 638.
79. See Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095 n.6. For an explanation of why Morris and
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court ambiguously noted that it would not have adopted the holdings of
Morris and Maya had it addressed the property of the estate issue,8 0 cit-
ing Creative Data Forms, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Minority Business Development
Authority. l8
In Creative Data Forms, a debtor sued a state agency seeking turnover
of escrowed loan proceeds which the agency had refused to disburse to
the debtor under a previously executed loan agreement between the
agency and the debtor.8 2 The agency had disbursed slightly less than
fifty percent of the loan proceeds prior to the debtor's Chapter 11 filing,
but refused to disburse the balance of the loan funds after the bank-
ruptcy filing.8 3 Both the bankruptcy court and the district court rejected
the debtor's turnover request, holding that turnover was not required
because the undisbursed funds were not property of the estate.8 4 The
district court reasoned that because the debtor never had possession of
the undisbursed funds and could not exercise any legal or equitable
rights that would grant it possession, the escrowed loan funds did not
fall within the definition of property of the estate.8 5
Although the Watts court sidestepped the property of the estate is-
sue by holding that section 365(e)(2)(B) of the Code rendered section
362 inapplicable,8 6 it did recognize that Creative Data Forms held that the
unpaid balance of an escrowed loan provided by a state agency to a mi-
nority business was not property of the estate.8 7 This reference to Crea-
tive Data Forms demonstrates a reluctance on the part of the court to
summarily abide by the lower courts' holdings that the prospective
HEMAP payments were property of the plaintiffs' estate.8 8 Moreover,
the court noted that the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code
Maya are distinguishable from Watts, see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying
text.
80. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095 n.7.
81. 72 Bankr. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1986).
82. Creative Data Forms, 72 Bankr. at 620-21.
83. Id. at 621. The borrower-debtor, Creative Data Forms, Inc. (Creative),
was a minority business. Id. at 620. The state agency, Pennsylvania Minority
Business Development Authority (PMBDA), had approved a $100,000 loan to
Creative and had disbursed $46,535 of that amount prior to Creative's bank-
ruptcy filing. Id. at 620-21. Shortly after the filing, Creative requested a lump-
sum disbursement of the entire $54,454 balance that was being held in escrow.
Id. at 621. PMBDA refused this request. Id.
84. In re Creative Data Forms, Inc., 41 Bankr. 334, 337 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984); Creative Data Forms, 72 Bankr. at 624.
85. Id. at 622-24.
86. See Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095-96. For the reasoning of the Watts court as
to why section 362 was inapplicable, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
87. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095 n.7.
88. It appears that by using the "but cf." signal immediately before citing
Creative Data Forms the Third Circuit intended for the case to be compared with,
rather than contrasted with, the lower courts' property of the estate holdings.
Id.; see A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 9 (14th ed. 1986). Creative Data Forms was
not cited as authority contrary to the lower courts' holdings. This may be an
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would not be affected by holding the automatic stay inapplicable to the
HEMAP payments, since mortgagees were precluded from foreclosing
on the debtor while the stay was in effect. 89
C. Executory Contract Provision
Section 365(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits termination
or modification of an executory contract of the debtor solely because of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.9 0 Section 365(e)(2)(B) exempts
from this general rule executory contracts "to make a loan, or extend
other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit
of the debtor . ..,91 The Watts court held that PHFA's commitment to
provide mortgage assistance "plainly constitute[d]" an executory con-
tract that fell within section 365(e)(2)(B) and, therefore, PHFA had a
statutory right to terminate the assistance under section 365(e)(2)(B).92
Therefore, the crucial issue was whether the automatic stay provi-
sion of section 362 would apply even though section 365(e)(2)(B) ex-
pressly permitted termination of the PHFA contract.9 3 The Watts court
held that it did not apply.9 4 The reasoning of the court was that section
365 specifically permitted termination by PHFA and, thus, section 362
should not be interpreted to conflict with such a specific grant by Con-
gress. 95 Further, the court ruled that the lending, nondebtor party, such
as PHFA, need not seek relief from the automatic stay before acting uni-
acknowledgement by the Watts court that the lower courts' holdings are more
strongly supported by existing case law.
89. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1096. Because foreclosure is prohibited during the
stay, the court stated that the bankruptcy court's assertion that the continuation
of HEMAP assistance was "vital to Plaintiffs to retain their shelter" was simply
untrue. Id. (quoting In re Watts, 76 Bankr. 390, 407 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).
90. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B) (1988).
91. Id. § 365(e)(2)(B).
92. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095-96. The court's ruling that the PHFA contract
was executory appears to be well-supported in the case law because an "execu-
tory contract" is generally defined as one in which performance is due on both
sides. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The court pointed out that per-
formance was due on both sides in Watts: PHFA was obligated to advance pay-
ments and the plaintiffs were obligated to repay PHFA. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text. If the only performance that remained was repayment by
the plaintiffs, the contract would not have been held to be executory. Watts, 876
F.2d at 1096 n.9; see In re Pennsylvania Tire Co., 26 Bankr. 663, 674 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1982), In re Kash & Karry Wholesale, Inc., 28 Bankr. 66, 69 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1982).
93. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1096.
94. Id.
95. Id. This reasoning comports with the Supreme Court's ruling that sec-
tions of a statute must be read in "the context of the whole Act," therefore,
where one section explicitly governs an issue, another section should not be
interpreted to cause an irreconcilable conflict. See Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1, 11 (1962); accord In re New Town Mall, 17 Bankr. 326, 329 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1982) (refusing to grant protection under section 362 when intent of Congress
appears clear at section 365).
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laterally and terminating the executory loan contract. 9 6
III. ANALYSIS
A. Anti-Discrimination Provision
The Watts court relied heavily upon In re Goldrich in holding that
section 525 was not violated by PHFA.97 Reliance on the dicta of Gol-
drich, specifically that regarding Congress's failure to include loans or
other forms of credit in the lists of grants in section 525, was clearly
appropriate. Goldrich, however, is factually distinguishable from Watts.
Goldrich involved a post-discharge denial of credit, while Watts involved a
termination of credit due to the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 98 In
short, Goldrich was not a case in which credit was denied solely because
of a bankruptcy filing. Instead, the denial of credit in Goldrich was due
primarily to the failure of the credit applicant to have paid a prior similar
debt. That fact alone would seemingly take the Goldrich case outside of
section 525.9 9
Therefore, in a factual sense, reliance on Goldrich may be misplaced.
Yet, from the standpoint of statutory construction, Goldrich is persuasive
authority. The Goldrich court highlighted the major flaw in the theory
that section 525 should be read broadly to cover loans when it stated:
Although the exact scope of the items [in section 525] may be
undefined, the fact that the list is composed solely of benefits
conferred by the state that are unrelated to credit is unambigu-
ous. Congress' failure to manifest any intention to include
items of a distinctly different character is also unambiguous. In
the absence of ambiguity, no further inquiry is required.10 0
The inference to be drawn from this statement from the Goldrich
court is that had Congress intended for section 525 to be so broad, it
96. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1096. The court noted, however, that "the
nondebtor party acting unilaterally may want to make a motion for relief from
the automatic stay in a doubtful case in order to avoid liability for ex parte action
which is later determined to be unlawful." Id. at 1096 n. 11.
97. For a discussion of In re Goldrich and the Watts court's reliance upon it,
see supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
98. In fact, in Watts, the mortgage assistance was reinstated after the plain-
tiffs had received a discharge in bankruptcy. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1092.
99. One of the requirements of section 525 is that the negative action taken
against the person be done "solely because" the person is or has been under the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988). The facts of Goldrich indicate that
this requirement was not met.
100. Goldrich, 771 F.2d at 30; see also In re Exquisito Servs., Inc., 823 F.2d
151, 153 (5th Cir. 1987) ("better approach" is to focus on specified language of
section, read legislative history more narrowly, and apply section "only to situa-
tions analogous to those enumerated in the statute"); In re Rees, 61 Bankr. 114,
124 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) (government entity's conduct does not fall within
purview of section 525(a) where entity does not have power to grant or deny
licenses, permits, charters, franchises or any similar grant).
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would have explicitly said so. This argument has considerable appeal,
especially considering the detailed list of items contained in the section.
Indeed, if Congress truly intended for section 525 to apply to various
forms of governmental discrimination, why did it not list various unre-
lated items in the section? Or why did it not just set forth a per se rule
prohibiting discrimination by governmental units on the basis of bank-
ruptcy filings? The fact that it did not exercise either of these two
broader options evidences an implicit desire to limit section 525 to only
those cases similar to the facts in Perez.
While sympathetic bankruptcy courts across the country have cho-
sen to interpret section 525 broadly in an effort to help unfortunate
debtors,' 0 ' the support for such an interpretation is tenuous at best.
Perhaps the most conclusive evidence that these courts have interpreted
section 525 too broadly is that nearly every circuit court of appeals that
has addressed section 525 has done so by applying the literal ap-
proach.' 0 2 By adopting the literal approach and finding no policy rea-
sons to extend section 525, the Watts decision is thus consistent with the
prevailing authority on the issue.
B. Automatic Stay Provision
Even if the HEMAP assistance payments were considered to be
property of the estate, there were no policy considerations in Watts simi-
lar to those in the energy assistance cases that would mandate a holding
that the automatic stay should apply. The creditor in Watts never re-
ceived the payments at issue. Therefore, there was no equitable policy
consideration involving a creditor that has collected an otherwise uncol-
lectable debt as there was in both Morris and Maya.
Moreover, as the Watts court stated, the policy of the automatic
stay-to give the debtor a "breathing spell"-was not affected by hold-
ing that the stay was inapplicable under the facts of Watts, for while the
stay was in effect mortgagees were precluded from foreclosing.10 3
Thus, the continuation of HEMAP assistance was not essential to the
plaintiffs' efforts to retain their homes. Additionally, the record re-
flected that PHFA reinstated the plaintiffs' assistance and cured their
101. It should be noted that the majority of bankruptcy courts that have
had occasion to interpret section 525 have done so broadly in alleged compli-
ance with the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Watts, 76
Bankr. 390, 405-06 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Sudler, 71 Bankr. 780, 786-87
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Hopkins, 66 Bankr. 828, 833-34 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1986); In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., 66 Bankr. 723, 740-43 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
See generally Annotation, supra note 47.
102. See In re Exquisito Servs., Inc., 823 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir. 1987); In
re Goodrich, 771 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Laracuente v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying literal approach to section
525(b)); cf. Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging
"fresh start" policy of Code, but limiting applicability of section 525).
103. Watts, 876 F.2d at 1096.
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mortgage defaults after the plaintiffs received a discharge in
bankruptcy. ' 0 4
With respect to the issue of whether prospective assistance pay-
ments constitute property of the estate, until the Supreme Court rules
directly on the issue, it is likely that lower courts will continue to take a
somewhat ad hoc approach to the issue, focusing more on the needs of
the debtor than on the statutory definition of property of the estate.
Therefore, it would appear that in cases like Watts, where the plaintiff-
debtors were much less in need of the protection of the automatic stay,
courts may be more willing to narrowly construe the definition of prop-
erty of the estate.10 5
C. Executory Contract Provision
From a practical standpoint, the portion of the Watts decision that
addresses the executory contract provision is potentially devastating to
the debtor. Once it is decided that section 365(e) controls, the lender in
an executory loan contract with a debtor is free to walk away from the
contract obligations at any time. Further, in the event that the lender
decides not to reinstate the loan assistance after the debtor receives a
discharge in bankruptcy, the debtor would then be faced with mortgage
default and imminent foreclosure with no immediate help in sight. Such
a result seems to violate the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy
Code. 0 6
On the other hand, it is inequitable to force the nondebtor party to
continue to make assistance payments to a creditor of a liquidating
debtor. Yet, this would be the result if the automatic stay provision con-
trolled in a case like Watts. One of the purposes of the automatic stay is
to fix the rights and priorities of creditors as of the time of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition.' 0 7 Forcing the nondebtor to continue to make
payments, and allowing the creditor to receive those payments while
other creditors of the debtor were no longer receiving payments, would
be contrary to that objective.
The Watts opinion correctly applies the tenets of statutory construc-
tion. Section 365(e)(2)(B) is specific and applies directly to the facts of
Watts. It should prevail over the more general automatic stay provi-
104. Id. at 1092.
105. For a discussion of property of the estate as defined under section 541
of the Code, see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code,
see supra note 32 and accompanying text. The "fresh start" policy is violated
when the debtor no longer receives mortgage assistance because the debtor is
then faced with the prospect of being evicted from his home.
107. See In re Paul, 67 Bankr. 342, 345 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). Further, the
legislative history of section 362 states that "[b]ankruptcy is designed to provide
an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6297.
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sion.108 Therefore, even where section 362 applies to the types of con-
tracts described in section 365(e)(2), "the effect of the [automatic] stay
should be simply to preserve the status quo rather than to compel per-
formance by the nondebtor party."' 10 9 Where both sections are applica-
ble, the stay should be vacated."l 0
IV. CONCLUSION
In holding that PHFA did not violate the Bankruptcy Code when it
discontinued mortgage assistance payments to the plaintiffs' creditors,
the Third Circuit in Watts joined the majority of circuit courts in adopt-
ing the literal interpretation of section 525 of the Code and refusing to
extend its protection beyond the language of the statute. Simultane-
ously, the court held that section 362 was rendered inapplicable by sec-
tion 365. This holding not only represented a novel approach to the
issue, but also enabled the court to avoid ruling on whether the HEMAP
payments constituted property of the debtor's estate. Further, the court
found no policy or equitable grounds which entitled the plaintiffs to pro-
tection since there existed no fear of imminent foreclosure. Thus, the
Watts decision maintains the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code, without
sacrificing the underlying policy.
Richard Ruffee
108. But see In re Computer Communications, Inc., 824 F.2d 725, 730 (9th
Cir. 1987) (even if section 365(e)(2) permits termination of executory contract,
section 362 automatically stayed termination).
109. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 365.06 (15th ed. 1989).
110. Id.
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